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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	examines	the	colonial	roots	of	counterinsurgency	practices	deployed	by	the	US	after	September	11,
2011	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	Drawing	on	a	broad	range	of	primary	sources	produced	by	the	US	military	and	its
officers	and	soldiers,	the	chapter	argues	that	the	counterinsurgency	practices	were	intended	as	liberal	forms	of
warfare	that	through	the	use	of	law,	administration,	and	procedure	intended	to	facilitate	the	conquest	and
management	of	intransigent	populations	in	those	two	countries.	Given	the	broader	failure	of	such	practices	to
pacify	the	conquered	populations	and	the	high	cost—in	blood,	treasure,	and	political	credibility—of	maintaining
such	futile	warfare,	the	US	has	now	changed	gears	to	counterterrorism,	which	is	far	more	about	direct	violence
than	it	is	about	imperial	management	and	transformation	of	conquered	populations.
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Although	the	concept	of	“counterinsurgency”—asymmetric	and	irregular	warfare—has	been	part	of	the	military
parlance	of	many	modern	states,	the	term	itself	was	invented	by	Walt	Rostow	in	1961,	when	he	was	US	President
John	F.	Kennedy’s	national	security	advisor. 	Throughout	the	decades	since	1961,	the	term	and	the	apparatus	it
signifies	have	been	incorporated	into	US	military	practices	and	doctrines	with	varying	degrees	of	enthusiasm.	The
modular	set	of	tactics,	techniques,	and	discourses	that	are	variously	concatenated	to	produce	the	range	of
different	“small	wars”	fought	by	the	United	States	since	its	inception	have	been	perfected	on	the	battlefields	of
colonization	and	decolonization	by	the	militaries	of	Britain,	France,	and	the	United	States	itself. 	The	battlefields	on
which	these	practices	have	been	effectuated,	adapted,	and	institutionalized	have	included	numerous	wars,	military
interventions,	peacekeeping	operations,	covert	military	activities,	and	“foreign	military	assistance”	operations
undertaken	by	the	US	and	its	near	and	far	allies.
Counterinsurgencies	differ	from	conventional	warfare	not	only	in	the	latter’s	focus	on	battles	fought	on	the	field,	but
also	in	conventional	warfare’s	clearly	delineated	set	of	rules	of	engagement	and	legal	boundaries,	however
haphazardly	these	are	enforced.	Counterinsurgency,	in	contrast,	arranges	a	state	military	(whether	invading	or
indigenous)	against	irregular	or	guerrilla	forces,	and	with	civilian	populations	directly	considered	by	both	sides	as
foci	of	strategic	attention. 	I	also	distinguish	liberal	counterinsurgencies	from	the	illiberal	variants. 	Illiberal
counterinsurgents—Russia	in	Chechnya,	or	the	Sri	Lankan	defeat	of	the	Tamil	Tigers—use	kinetic,	or	killing	force
indiscriminately	and	very	often	deploy	the	language	of	sovereignty	as	the	ultimate	justification	for	their	use	of
force.	Liberal	counterinsurgencies,	by	contrast,	calibrate	their	use	of	force,	co-opt	legal	and	administrative
apparatuses	in	the	service	of	warfare,	and	increasingly	deploy	a	language	of	humanitarianism	and/or	development
as	both	the	justification	and	impetus	for	war.	In	all	counterinsurgencies,	the	civilian	population	is	the	prize,	to	be
won	whether	by	persuasion	and	bribery	or	force	of	intimidation	and	terror.
Transformations	in	Combat	in	the	War	on	Terror
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After	the	destruction	of	the	World	Trade	Center	in	New	York	and	the	attack	on	the	Pentagon	in	September	2011,	the
government	of	the	United	States	set	about	waging	an	indefinite	war	against	those	considered	culpable	for	the
attacks:	al-Qā’ida,	but	also	their	hosts,	the	Afghan	Taliban,	and	eventually	even	past	enemy	Iraq,	with	no
connections	whatsoever	to	the	September	11	attacks.
The	US	invasion	of	Afghanistan	in	October	2001,	dubbed	“Operation	Enduring	Freedom,”	began	with	an	array	of
tactics	that	today	would	be	best	categorized	under	the	heading	of	counterterrorism	or	covert	operations.	These
included	the	insertion	of	special	operations	forces	primarily	belonging	to	the	CIA’s	militia,	the	Special	Activities
Division,	soon	to	be	joined	by	the	US	military’s	Joint	Special	Operations	Forces	(JSOC). 	It	also	included	aerial
bombardment	using	Tomahawk	Cruise	Missiles	launched	from	US	navy	ships,	as	well	as	the	use	of	helicopter
gunships	and	eventually	fighter	and	bomber	jets, 	and	provision	of	financial	and	military	aid	to	the	Afghan	Northern
Alliance	fighters. 	From	December	2001	onwards,	US	Central	Command	(CENTCOM)	forces	conducted
counterterror	operations	under	the	umbrella	of	Operation	Enduring	Freedom.	At	the	same	time,	the	International
Security	Assistance	Forces	(ISAF)	comprised	military	personnel	from	a	number	of	different	allied	countries	provided
military	policing	functions	in	Kabul	and	later	throughout	Afghanistan.	A	year	later,	the	dual	forces	were	joined	by
the	reborn	Afghan	National	Army.	ISAF	was	brought	under	NATO	command	in	2003,	operating	alongside	US	and
Afghan	forces	mostly	in	counterinsurgency	mode.
The	invasion	of	Iraq	in	2003,	by	contrast,	first	took	shape	as	conventional	(though	radically	asymmetric)	warfare;
but	with	the	rapid	defeat	of	the	Iraqi	military	and	the	US	takeover	of	Iraq’s	territories	and	major	cities,	and	with	the
eventual	appearance	of	guerrilla	forces,	it	assumed	a	haphazard	form	of	counterinsurgency,	with	emphasis	on	the
killing	of	irregular	forces. 	The	special	operators	of	Joint	Special	Operations	Command	(JSOC)	under	the	command
of	General	Stanley	McChrystal	also	continued	to	operate	in	the	shadows,	engaging	in	assassination	and	detentions.
Their	most	notable	target	had	been	Abu	Mus’ab	Zarqawi,	and	their	detention	practices	in	Camp	Nama	had	come
under	investigative	journalists’	scrutiny. 	The	extraordinary	escalation	in	irregular	attacks	against	US	forces,	the
slowly	mounting	popular	domestic	unease	with	US	atrocities	in	Iraq	(beginning	with	the	Abu	Ghraib	revelations),	and
the	dizzying	rise	of	civilian	Iraqi	deaths	led	to	a	two-pronged	transformation	in	the	US	military’s	approach	to	combat
there. 	The	first	of	these	transformations	was	the	consolidation	of	counterinsurgency	tactics	in	the	US	Army	and
Marine	Corps’	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual. 	The	second	entailed	changes	at	policy	level,	with	a	“surge”	of
troops	into	Iraq	under	the	command	of	General	David	Petraeus	and	the	implementation	of	the	tactics	that	had	now
been	consolidated	in	the	Field	Manual.
In	schematic	tactical	terms,	what	the	transition	from	conventional	warfare	to	the	“surge”	entailed	was	an	increase
in	number	of	troops	to	allow	for	“clear-hold-build”	tactics:	door-to-door	“clearing”	of	abodes,	streets,	and	cities	of
insurgents;	establishment	of	small	neighborhood	bases	to	allow	perpetual	policing	of	the	neighborhood	by	the
invading	force;	and	the	calibrated	distribution	of	aid	intended	to	secure	acquiescence,	as	well	as	construction	of
facilities	such	as	roads	and	other	infrastructure	that	can	be	used	both	defensively	and	as	a	means	of	enforcing
normalcy. 	In	practice,	these	tactics	meant	a	shift	from	battles	by	military	forces	to	a	focus	on	detention,	both	of
combatants	and	civilian	suspects	and	of	civilian	populations	who	may	be	inclined	to	support	the	militants. 	The
“surge”	of	troops	accommodated	not	only	combat	activities	but	also	the	training	of	proxy	security	forces.
Even	as	the	surge	was	taking	place,	US	military	and	civilian	policymakers	were	planning	for	the	withdrawal	of	the
great	majority	of	the	US	forces	from	Iraq,	scaling	back	direct	activities	there,	to	allow	for	the	consolidation	of	the
Iraqi	state’s	hold	over	the	country.
What	this	second	transition	entailed	was	a	shift	from	counterinsurgency	to	counterterrorism:	a	radical	reduction	in
the	number	of	invading	and	occupying	ground	troops,	a	discernible	shift	in	combat	into	the	shadow	spaces	of
covert	and	robotic	wars,	and	a	focus	on	special	operations,	remote	warfare,	and	intelligence-gathering. 	This
switchback	from	“humanitarian”	detentions	to	kinetic	force	was	also	in	line	with	a	more	obviously	realist	foreign
and	military	intervention	policy,	as	embodied	in	the	decision-making	of	George	W.	Bush	and	Barack	Obama
administrations’	Defense	Secretary	Robert	Gates,	and	the	Obama	national	security	team.	This	more	realist	mode
was	best	on	display	in	the	US	Defense	Strategic	Guidance	of	January	2012,	which,	alongside	announcing	a	“pivot
to	Asia,”	declared	that	“US	forces	will	no	longer	be	sized	to	conduct	large-scale,	prolonged	stability	operations.”
Throughout	this	period,	in	both	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	and	in	the	other	battlefields	of	the	War	on	Terror	(Yemen,
Pakistan,	and	Somalia,	inter	alia),	local	proxies	have	been	absolutely	crucial,	not	only	to	grant	permission	for
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operations	but	in	fact	to	claim	the	operations	as	their	own	(as	the	Yemeni,	Pakistani,	and	Iraqi	militaries	have	done
at	various	times),	to	share	intelligence,	and	to	provide	the	cover	of	plausible	American	deniability.	US	military
advisors,	intelligence	agents,	and	special	operators	all	have	continued	to	assist	the	proxy	forces	in	this	work	of
suppression.
Iron	Fist	or	Velvet	Glove?
What	is	perhaps	most	notable	about	the	manner	in	which	counterinsurgency	and	counterterrorism	have	worked	is
the	modularity	of	the	various	tactics,	techniques,	and	technologies	that	can	be	flexibly	concatenated	in	order	to
achieve	the	best	results	within	a	given	context.	The	oscillation	between	counterinsurgency	and	counterterrorism
strategies	in	war	is	based	on	a	complex	calculus	of	costs,	interim	outcomes,	and	future	possibilities,	not	to	mention
ideologies,	historical	inertias	and	memories,	and	popular	mobilization	for	or	against	the	war.	The	spectrum	along
which	these	two	forms	of	asymmetric	warfare	are	located	move	from	biopolitics	to	thanatopolitics.	At	one	end	is	the
set	of	techniques	and	tactics,	that	while	using	force,	also	remake	living	bodies	and	habitations	and	social	relations,
“making	live	and	letting	die”	in	Foucault’s	words;	while	at	the	other	end,	sovereign	power	allows	for	brutal
slaughter	should	the	state	apparatuses	so	demand.
Whereas	large-scale	direct	counterinsurgencies	are	fought	with	large	numbers	of	conventional	troops,
counterterrorism	condenses	the	number	of	personnel	and	volume	of	material	needed,	which	inevitably	allows	for
this	form	of	warfare	to	maintain	a	degree	of	invisibility	from	public	scrutiny. 	If	counterinsurgencies	provide	the
technical	means	for	implementation	of	liberal	interventionist	policies,	counterterrorism	is	the	military	option	more
congruent	with	“realist”	policy	discourses.
Counterinsurgencies	integrate	humanitarian	or	developmental	apparatuses	and	discourses	with	the	work	of	military
combat.	They	often	require	large	nodal	military	bases	and	more	numerous	and	diffuse	smaller	ones,	massive
logistics	operations,	and	extensive	and	visible	presence	of	ground	troops	in	combat,	very	frequently	supported	by
fighter	jets	or	helicopter	gunships.	Counterinsurgency	combat	operations,	by	virtue	of	their	breadth	and	density,
tend	to	occur	door	to	door,	and	in	a	sense	turn	public	and	private	spaces	inside	out. 	As	liberal
counterinsurgencies	require	mobilization	of	troops,	material,	and	resources,	they	need	public	support	at	home,
which	is	often	secured	via	information	operations,	appeal	to	law,	developmental	aims,	discourse	of
democratization,	and	a	call	for	good	order.
In	practice,	this	insistence	on	lawfulness	means	that	new	legal	techniques,	arenas,	and	languages	are	concocted
that	provide	an	alibi	to	the	military	and	political	operations	that	make	counterinsurgency	possible,	but	which	are
also	the	subject	of	contestation. 	While	the	horizons	of	legality	are	expanded	by	the	exigencies	of	combat,	legal
innovations	provide	new	tools	for	counterinsurgency	pacification.	Among	these	new	and	revivified	legal	tools	have
been	military	commissions	(rooted	in	nineteenth-century	wars	against	Native	Americans),	extraordinary	rendition,
offshore	detention	(discussed	later),	and	the	category	of	“enemy	combatant.”
Developmentalism,	in	turn,	works	in	two	registers:	on	the	one	hand,	the	construction	of	roads,	electricity	plants,
markets,	and	other	infrastructural	projects	underwrites	the	military	efforts	by	being	a	site	of	military	activity. 	On
the	other	hand,	and	over	a	longer	period	of	time,	these	infrastructures	act	to	co-opt	the	pacified	peoples	into	new
systems	of	governmentality.	In	addition	to	the	construction	of	roads,	markets,	and	schools	that	have	been	part	of
the	modus	operandi	of	counterinsurgents,	forms	of	dress,	gender	relations,	and	new	bureaucratic	and
constitutional	apparatuses	are	other	mechanisms	of	counterinsurgency	governmentality.
Knowledge	production	and	the	incorporation	of	colonial	knowledge	into	apparatuses	of	waging	war	would	also	be
significant	facets	of	liberal	counterinsurgencies.	Demographics—particularly	of	the	kind	that	tracks	the	volume	of
“surplus	populations”	and	troublesome	“military-aged-males”—frames	the	counterinsurgency	episteme. 	A	kind
of	stultified	and	old-fashioned	ethnography,	premised	on	understanding	of	“adversary	culture”	provides	the
granular	tools	of	knowledge-gathering	about	intransigent	populations. 	While	in	the	War	on	Terror,	this
instrumental	knowledge	of	“culture”	has	been	transformed	into	the	institution	of	Human	Terrain	Systems	(mixed
teams	of	military	personnel	and	civilian	research	teams	that	gather	everyday	information	about	the	populations	to
be	pacified),	today,	there	are	calls	for	incorporating	ethnographic	and	cultural	knowledges	into	formal	apparatuses
of	intelligence-gathering.
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If	counterinsurgency	is	a	mailed	fist	in	a	velvet	glove,	in	counterterrorist	activities	the	gloves	come	off.	Kinetic
operations—those	that	employ	lethal	force—characterize	counterterrorism.	These	include	the	deployment	in
hundreds	of	countries	around	the	world	of	special	operations	forces,	often	dispatched	from	“floating	bases”	on
specially	configured	naval	vessels,	and	engaged	in	kidnapping	and	assassinations	on	the	one	hand,	and	training
of	allied	and	proxy	commando	forces	and	gathering	foreign	intelligence	on	the	other. 	Unmanned	aerial	vehicles
or	drones—which	are	also	used	in	counterinsurgencies	and	in	conventional	warfare—are	central	to
counterterrorism.	The	chains	of	commands	of	drone	and	special	operators	bypass	ordinary	structures	of	the
military	and	end	directly	in	the	White	House	or	the	offices	of	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	director,	and	as
the	focus	of	the	killings	are	often	inaccessible	and	distant	places,	counterterrorism	is	lauded	as	“minimalist”	and
“nonintrusive.”
In	what	follows,	I	will	shed	light	on	the	modular	techniques	and	technologies	that	form	the	basis	of	both
counterinsurgencies	and	counterterrorism	operations,	and	will	reflect	on	the	role	of	local	proxies.
Techniques	and	Technologies
Given	the	vast	investments	by	the	US	military	in	a	broad	range	of	technologies,	it	is	not	surprising	that	many	of
these	become	incorporated	into	the	US	counterinsurgency	and	counterterrorism	arsenal,	used	for	lethal	activities
as	well	as	surveillance	and	monitoring.	Just	as	important,	however,	is	the	use	of	detention	techniques,	which	serve
punitive,	performative,	and	pedagogic	means.
Confinement	and	Detention	Practices
One	of	the	most	distinct	characteristics	of	counterinsurgency	warfare	is	the	prevalence	of	confinement	as	a
technique	of	warfare,	as	opposed	to	slaughter. 	Confinement	and	detention	take	several	shapes:	they	include
battlefield	detentions	in	detention	camps,	offshore	internment	of	suspects	in	liminal	jurisdictional	circumstances,
and	mass	confinement	of	civilian	populations	intended	to	sever	their	support	for	irregular	forces.
Detention	camps	such	as	Abu	Ghraib,	Camp	Nama,	Camp	Cropper	in	Iraq,	and	the	Bagram	Airforce	Base	detention
camp	in	Afghanistan,	serve	as	holding	and	processing	sites	for	persons	suspected	of	being	combatants,	and
significantly,	also	vast	numbers	of	“military-aged	males”	who	are	often	caught	up	in	sweeps.	The	phrase	“military-
aged	male”	is	a	technical	military	designation	that	includes	men	of	diverse	age	ranges,	often	between	fifteen	and
sixty	years	old.	Throughout	the	Iraq	and	Afghan	wars,	population	sweeps	in	the	wake	of	attacks	on	US	forces
produced	neighborhood-wide	detention	of	vast	numbers	of	men.	The	genealogy	of	this	mass	detention	of
suspected	combatants	can	be	traced	back	to	colonial	and	anticolonial	counterinsurgencies. 	The	US	itself	had
extensive	prior	experience	with	such	detention	in	the	context	of	the	Phoenix	Program	in	Vietnam,	whose	primary
aim	was	to	destroy	the	civilian	support	mechanism	for	the	Viet	Cong	guerrillas.
In	both	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	the	aims	of	battlefield	detention	camps	have	been	manifold.	While	they	can	act	as
punitive	measures	against	combatants,	more	importantly	they	also	provide	occasions	for	intelligence-gathering	via
interrogation	and	surveillance,	the	use	of	combatants	as	potential	hostages,	and	as	holding	tanks	for	potential
combatants	in	contentious	neighborhoods	and	towns.	Also	significantly,	battlefield	detention	in	liberal
counterinsurgencies	includes	an	element	of	“counterinsurgency	inside	the	wire,”	or	a	complex	of	processes	that
further	strengthen	the	hegemonic	mechanisms	deployed	by	the	US	military.	These	processes	include	extensive
“re-education”	programs	meant	to	indoctrinate	the	detainees	against	future	activity.	Such	re-education	programs
have	included	religious	components	that	emphasize	“moderate”	sympathies. 	Further,	“counterinsurgency	inside
the	wire”	has	incorporated	a	set	of	procedures	within	its	release	process	that	requires	the	release	of	a	detainee	to
be	guaranteed	by	a	community	or	“tribal”	leader	“to	assume	responsibility	for	[the	detainees’]	post-release
conduct.” 	The	process	in	essence	acts	to	diffuse	the	disciplinary	mechanisms	of	detention	through	transforming
the	social	environments	of	the	former	detainees,	influencing	“the	detainees’	web	of	relatives,	friends,	and
tribesmen	who	were	directly	affected	by	their	internment	and	who,	by	some	estimates,	included	a	half-million
Iraqis,”
In	addition	to	camps	and	prisons	detaining	suspected	combatants	and	suspicious	civilians,	modern	liberal
counterinsurgents	have	deployed	the	mass	detention	of	civilians	as	another	mechanism	of	control	and	pacification.
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Such	mass	detention	can	occur	in	situ—with	the	enclavization	of	existing	centers	of	habitation,	or	through	the
resettlement	of	civilian	populations	into	newly	created	townships,	entry	and	exit	to	which	are	monitored,	and	which
are	often	encircled	by	barbed	wire	enclosures.	Examples	of	the	latter	include	the	concentration	camps	of	the	Boer
War,	the	New	Villages	of	Malaya,	the	centres	de	regroupement	of	Algeria,	and	the	strategic	hamlets	of	Vietnam.	As
the	technological	ability	to	conduct	monitoring	and	surveillance	has	improved	and	in	counterinsurgencies	where
the	population	is	primarily	urban	rather	than	disbursed	in	expanses	of	countryside,	resettlement	gives	way	to	in	situ
encirclement.	The	encirclement	of	Gaza	and	the	enclavization	of	the	West	Bank,	using	walls,	seam	zones,	and
other	mechanisms	of	control	is	the	best	example	of	in	situ	mass	confinement	par	excellence.	The	US	has	also
extensively	used	such	in	situ	mass	incarceration	in	a	range	of	insurgent	cities	in	Iraq,	especially	Falluja	and	in	the
neighborhoods	of	Baghdad.
The	mass	detention	of	civilians	provides	an	occasion	for	what	is	called	“population	control;”	preventing	civilians
from	aiding	the	guerrillas	with	victuals,	labeled	“food	control”	is	one	of	the	main	aims	of	controlling	the	population.
Food	control	is	effected	through	the	confiscation	or	rationing	of	food,	and	destruction	of	agricultural	products	via
defoliants	(such	as	Agent	Orange). 	The	mass	incarceration	of	civilians	is	also	seen	as	a	means	of	pooling
populations	that	could	either	act	as	hostages	or	as	sources	of	intelligence	about	the	movements	and	activities	of
guerrilla	forces. 	The	longer-term	effect	of	such	concentration	of	populations	and	their	detention	or	resettlement	is
social	engineering	on	a	mass	scale.	In	many	instances,	land	tenure	and	property	ownership	regimes	have	been
transformed;	community	boundaries	and	class	structures	have	been	remodeled;	vast	populations	have	been
brought	into	the	field	of	vision	of	the	state;	and	in	the	great	majority	of	instances,	a	kind	of	forced	urbanization	has
been	effected.
Perhaps	the	most	novel	forms	of	detention	in	the	War	on	Terror	have	been	the	range	of	practices	that	can	be
categorized	as	offshore	detention.	These	include	proxy	detention	via	extraordinary	rendition	and	detention	in
spaces	that	are	made	legally	liminal	in	order	to	ensure	invisibility	and	inaccessibility	of	detainees.	The	Guantánamo
Bay	detention	center	and	Bagram	Air	Force	base	best	fit	the	category	of	liminal	spaces	of	detention.	Because	the
Guantánamo	Bay	naval	base	is	located	in	a	corner	of	Cuba	(secured	by	the	US	via	colonial	means	in	perpetuity),
the	US	military	and	legal	apparatuses	have	attempted	to	exempt	it	from	habeas	corpus	claims	of	human	rights
lawyers.	Although	the	US	failed	to	prevent	Guantánamo	detainees	from	receiving	legal	representations,	it
succeeded	with	Bagram	Air	Force	base,	which	was	ruled	outside	US	legal	jurisdiction	by	the	US	Supreme	Court.
While	both	the	British	and	the	French	have	used	offshore	prisons	to	confine	rebel	and	revolutionary	anticolonial
leaders	after	trials,	the	pretrial	indefinite	detention	that	characterizes	Guantánamo	Bay	is	far	rarer. 	The	US	has
claimed	that	these	offshore	detention	sites	are	akin	to	prisoner-of-war	camps.	But	it	refuses	to	recognize	the
applicability	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	to	the	detainees.	Even	more	significant	is	both	the	indefiniteness	of	the
duration	of	the	War	on	Terror,	and	that	many	of	the	detainees	were	captured	in	places	far	from	the	battlefields	of
this	putative	war.
Extraordinary	rendition—or	detention	by	proxy—is	in	some	ways	less	novel:	where	the	tattered	remnants	of	legal
and	normative	prohibition	on	interrogation	under	torture	have	acted	as	an	obstacle	towards	torturing	detainees,	the
US	has	shipped	these	detainees	to	countries	that	have	little	legal	or	political	constraints	on	their	ability	to	extract
information	(often	false	and	useless)	from	detainees	placed	under	unimaginable	physical	and	psychological
distress. 	The	aforementioned	Phoenix	Program,	most	notorious	for	its	use	of	tiger	cages	on	Vietnamese	detainees
was	ostensibly	under	the	control	of	South	Vietnamese	forces,	while	the	Israeli	military	has	consistently	refused	to
acknowledge	that	it	was	responsible	for	the	Khiyam	Detention	Center	operated	by	its	proxy	force,	the	South
Lebanese	Army.
Remote	Control	Weaponry
Although	there	are	indications	that	the	US	had	developed	unmanned	aerial	vehicles	(UAVs,	or	drones)	as	early	as
the	1960s	and	used	them	for	intelligence-gathering	in	the	Vietnam	War,	the	weapons	were	not	provided	extensive
funding	by	either	the	Pentagon	or	the	CIA,	which	favored	spy	satellites. 	It	was	the	technological	advances	in	the
Israeli	use	of	remote	control	weaponry	in	the	early	2000s	that	encouraged	the	US	to	accelerate	the	development	of
drones	not	only	for	reconnaissance	but	also	for	assassination	purposes.	The	first	known	US	use	of	a	drone	for	an
assassination	took	place	in	February	2002	in	Pakistan. 	Since	then,	up	to	6,000	people	have	been	killed	by
drones	in	Pakistan,	Yemen,	and	Somalia,	many	of	them	civilians. 	The	primary	US	operators	of	assassination
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drones	are	the	Joint	Special	Operations	Command	(JSOC)	and	the	CIA.	Both	organizations	intensively	compete
against	one	another	for	the	control	of	the	program,	and	although	human	rights	organizations	have	demanded	that
the	program	be	operated	by	the	military	for	better	oversight,	the	US	military’s	JSOC	is	at	least	as	secretive	and
unaccountable	as	the	CIA,	having	been	set	up	to	operate	like	the	private	militia	of	the	US	executive	branch.
The	advocates	of	using	drones	for	assassination	defend	it	because	it	allows	for	a	“smaller	footprint,”	and	claim	that
as	a	weapon	it	is	more	precise	than	most	other	forms	of	aerial	bombing. 	A	former	legal	advisor	to	the	Israeli
military	and	current	human	rights	law	professor	at	Harvard	has	argued	that	“for	actors	committed	to	humanitarian
ideals,	the	coupling	of	remoteness	and	precision	[that	drones	represent]	allows	for	the	possibility	of	striking	only
those	most	‘deserving’	players—political	leaders,	military	commanders,	and	the	like.”
The	remote	lethality	of	drones,	however,	is	controversial	even	among	those	committed	to	liberal	interventionism.	It
is	the	perfect	vehicle	for	what	Martin	Shaw	has	called	“risk	transfer	war,”	in	which	the	danger	to	the	lives	of	US
military	personnel	is	contained	through	displacement	onto	the	bodies	of	the	“enemy,”	whether	civilian	or
combatant.
What	is	perhaps	most	striking	about	both	the	language	and	practice	of	drone	usage	is	the	extent	to	which	its
advocates’	language	of	“protection”	and	“precision”	is—like	so	many	other	modular	techniques	and	tactics	of
asymmetric	and	irregular	warfare—about	the	calibration	of	the	use	of	lethal	force	in	order	to	make	its	violence
palatable	to	the	public	constituencies	at	home. 	This	function	is	reinforced	by	the	inaccessibility	of	the	victims	of
drone	attacks	to	reporters,	and	their	invisibility	(except	as	photographic	negative	silhouettes	in	the	drone
operators’	crosshairs).	Even	more	harrowingly,	the	targets	of	drone	assassinations	could	be	chosen	not	only
because	they	are	specifically	named	persons	designated	as	targets	on	the	basis	of	intelligence,	but	also	on	the
basis	of	a	broad	profile	(two	or	three	“military-age	males”	in	a	location	considered	suspicious),	a	lethal	process
euphemistically	designated	“signature	strikes.” 	These	essentially	extend	the	shadow	of	death	to	people	simply
suspected	of	nefarious	activity—by	virtue	of	their	age,	location,	and	physical	appearance—without	any	solid
evidence	whatsoever.
Private	Firms
Most	militaries	have	intricate	and	dense	webs	of	connections	with	private	firms	that	provide	technical	and
technological	services	and	products	to	the	military	and	are	crucial	to	the	logistics	and	operational	activities	of
those	militaries.	In	the	War	on	Terror,	logistics	provision	firms	were	the	biggest	financial	beneficiaries	of	contracts;
KBR	Halliburton	and	Kuwait-based	Agility	received	$39.5	billion	and	$7.2	billion	respectively	in	contracts. 	Most
notably,	these	firms	often	employ	“third-country	nationals,”	or	immigrant	workers	from	countries	that	are	not	party
to	the	war.	The	massive	rise	in	the	employment	of	such	workers	in	menial	jobs	on	military	bases	(engaged	in
cooking	and	cleaning,	cutting	hair,	and	driving	goods	vehicles)	produces	a	hierarchy	of	labor	in	which	the
repressive	labor	practices	replicate	those	from	which	migrant	laborers	everywhere	suffer.
However,	the	rise	of	private	firms	in	waging	war,	intelligence-gathering,	policing,	security	provision,	and	frontline
activities	is	a	much	more	recent	affair. 	The	US	government	agencies’	extensive	use	of	corporate	warriors
employed	by	the	likes	of	Blackwater	(later	Xe;	currently	Academi),	Aegis	Defense	Services,	Control	Risks	Group,
Titan,	and	CACI,	in	both	an	arms-wielding	capacity	and	as	interrogators	has	rightfully	attracted	a	great	deal	of
attention.	Among	this	group	of	firms,	the	most	notorious	are	on	the	one	hand	Titan	and	CACI,	and	on	the	other	hand
Blackwater.	While	the	former	provided	interrogators	and	translators	broadly	implicated	in	tortures	in	Abu	Ghraib,
the	latter’s	warriors	were	engaged	in	a	number	of	different	scandals	involving	attacks	on	civilians	in	Iraq. 	Just	as
significant	is	the	gargantuan	private	intelligence-gathering	apparatuses	that	serve	both	the	government’s	military,
intelligence,	and	domestic	law-enforcement	services	and	the	voracious	demand	for	private	or	industrial
intelligence.
In	some	ways	the	use	of	private	warriors	best	embodies	the	transformation	in	waging	war	in	a	neoliberal	age.
Sovereign	functions	of	the	state,	and	its	capacity	to	wield	death,	are	outsourced:	fighting	is	displaced	onto	persons
who	are	categorized	as	“civilians;”	and	the	exercise	of	violence	is	classified	into	a	broad	range	of	subcategories,
from	security	detail	to	force	protection	to	armed	reconstruction	or	reconnaissance	work,	and,	of	course,	the	broad
range	of	intelligence-gathering	functions.	This	finessing	of	the	different	coercive	functions	means	that	the	use	of
violence	can	be	calibrated	or	justified	in	a	diverse	way,	permitting	a	great	deal	of	malleability	in	use.	The
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fluctuations	in	the	applicability	of	laws	and	military	regulations	to	private	warriors	further	allows	a	degree	of
impunity,	invisibility,	and	unaccountability	to	the	private	firms.
More	fundamentally,	a	war	fought	by	military	warriors	most	brazenly	normalizes	the	equation	of	violence	with
economic	enterprise,	and	through	the	structure	of	the	free	market	embeds	the	will	to	war	in	the	largest	number	of
people	vested	in	the	private	firms.	In	a	sense,	such	private	firms	effect	the	distribution	of	responsibility	and	the
desire	for	violence	to	the	broadest	segments	of	the	public,	while	at	the	same	time,	through	the	structures	of
corporate	privacy,	they	severely	limit	public	participation	in	the	decision-making	processes	that	go	on	within	the
firms.	As	such,	private	military	forms	most	clearly	reflect	neoliberal	ethos	and	practice:	not	the	retreat	of	the	state,
but	its	reconfiguration	as	a	machine	whose	primary	function	is	the	facilitation	of	enterprise.
Biometrics	and	Big	Data
The	fetishes	for	privatized	intelligence-gathering	and	for	the	newest	technology	converge	in	the	rapidly	expanding
commercial	sector	of	biometrics	and	“big	data.”	Biometrics	allows	the	collection	of	biological	markers	(iris	patterns,
fingerprints,	facial	recognition	software,	and	other	distinct	and	unique	bodily	identifiers)	in	easily	accessed	digital
forms.
The	roots	of	biometrics	lie	in	the	old-fashioned	identity	card,	used	as	a	tool	of	surveillance	and	pacification	by	the
French	in	Syria	in	the	1920s	and	by	the	British	in	Palestine	in	the	1930s. 	As	identity	cards	have	become
increasingly	sophisticated,	they	have	continuously	incorporated	advances	in	the	science	of	identification. 	In	the
counterinsurgency	contexts,	whether	analogue	or	digital,	they	allow	for	tracking	the	movements	of	persons
passing	through	checkpoints,	and	for	more	longitudinal	or	spatial	mapping	of	vast	numbers	of	peoples.	In	Falluja	in
Iraq,	for	example,	the	US	issued	identity	cards	or	badges	that	listed	“the	kinship	affiliations	of	the	bearer,	their
place	of	work	and	residence,	any	detention	history,	and	contain	biometric	data	including	fingerprints	and	iris
scans.” 	This	form	of	tracking	is	not	only	a	passive	means	of	intelligence-gathering,	it	also	allows	the
counterinsurgent	force	to	harass	or	intimidate.	After	gathering	such	data	(and	depositing	them	in	the	Biometrics
Fusion	Center	in	Virginia)	the	US	military	affixed	posters	in	Falluja	that	announced,	“We	know	where	you	are	and
what	you	are	doing.	Who	will	you	trust	now?”
The	information	gathered	via	biometrics	is	only	one	category	of	data	aggregated	by	“big	data”	technologies.
Mining	for	big	data,	of	course,	occurs	within	a	great	many	sectors	(as	well	as	academia)	and	essentially	allows	for
the	aggregation,	manipulation,	and	interpretation	of	vast	numbers	of	datapoints	often	collected	through	trawling	the
internet,	multiple	open	or	proprietary	databases,	or	other	digital	or	digitized	resources.	Where	identity	cards	and
biometrics	are	the	perfect	instruments	of	a	politics	of	security,	big	data	facilitates	forecasting,	prediction,	and	what
Louise	Amoore	has	called	the	“politics	of	possibility.” 	If	a	politics	of	security	depends	on	a	calculation	of	risks	on
the	basis	of	statistical	reasoning,	big	data,	used	in	the	service	of	security,	counterinsurgency,	or	counterterrorism,
provides	the	necessary	mathematical	underpinnings	of	decision-making	simply	to	prevent	even	the	possibility	of
risk.
The	collection	of	vast	amounts	of	data—texts	of	emails,	electronic	correspondence,	and	conversation	metadata,
recordings	of	conversations	on	landlines,	mobile	phone	lines,	or	via	software—by	the	National	Security	Agency
(and	its	private	contractors,	including	Booz	Allen,	which	had	employed	Edward	Snowden)	is	the	most	obvious	and
egregious	example	of	mining	for	“big	data.”
But	such	“big	data”	can	also	be	collected	by	private	firms	on	contract	to	various	US	agencies.	The	dizzying
proliferation	of	“frontier	consulting”	firms,	populated	by	former	counterinsurgency,	special	operations,	and
intelligence	operatives	attests	to	the	faith	of	government	agencies	in	ever-broadening	bodies	of	data	guiding	aid,
foreign,	and	military	policies.	Among	these	firms,	for	example,	is	Caerus,	founded	by	counterinsurgency	supremo
David	Kilcullen,	which	uses	big	data	to	map	a	range	of	social	and	political	processes	in	places	such	as	Syria,
Somalia,	San	Salvador,	and	Colombia.
The	Irresistible	Rise	of	Proxies
If	the	concatenation	of	a	series	of	modular	technologies	and	techniques	elides	the	reality	of	US	counterinsurgency
as	a	kind	of	biopolitics	at	the	muzzle	of	a	gun	and	US	counterterrorism	as	thanatopolitics,	the	most	important
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lubricant	of	US	action	overseas	has	been	the	presence	of	willing	and	eager	proxies.	As	an	enthusiastic	advocate
of	US	empire,	Robert	Kaplan	has	frankly	admitted,	“Imperialism	[is]	less	about	conquest	than	about	the	training	of
local	armies.	Reliance	on	American	techniques	and	weapons	systems,	and	the	relationship	established	between
American	officers	and	their	third	world	protégés,	helped	give	the	US	the	access	it	needed	around	the	globe.”
Similarly,	the	best-known	US	counterinsurgent,	General	David	Petraeus,	has	quoted	T.	E.	Lawrence	on	the	use	of
proxies:	“Do	not	try	to	do	too	much	with	your	own	hands.”
More	than	any	other	political	practice,	the	use	of	proxies	allows	for	exogenous	political	relations—political	and
economic	hierarchies,	use	of	force,	exploitation,	ideologies,	unequal	access	to	resources,	and	forms	of	domination
—to	be	translated	and	incorporated	into	endogenous	actors	and	activities.	Proxies	provide	the	veil	of	“local”
legitimacy.	The	most	immediate	form	the	use	of	proxies	takes	is	the	training	of	security	forces—either	in	situ	or	in
academies,	schools,	and	bases	in	the	US	(and	Europe). 	Similarly,	the	presence	of	both	more	massive	and
permanent	bases	and	the	smaller	lilypad	variety	overseas	also	requires	the	acquiescence,	support,	and	protection
of	the	host	governments. 	Most	important,	of	course,	is	the	intertwining	of	the	national	political	and	economic	elites
in	the	global	webs	of	neoliberal	economy,	founded	on	capital	accumulation	and	violence.
Using	local	clients	and	training	local	security	forces	to	engage	in	counterinsurgency	under	the	tutelage	of	the
metropolitan	force	allow	for	costs	(in	blood	and	treasure	and	reputation),	responsibilities,	accountability,	and	blame
to	be	devolved	from	the	metropolitan	centers	to	the	margins.	Though	dependence	on	local	clients	(many	of	whose
elite	are	pursuing	their	own	interests)	is	not	without	liabilities,	it	is	nevertheless	calculated	to	be	a	more	effective
and	cost-efficient	form	of	presence	on	asymmetric	battlefields.
The	extent	to	which	the	US	has	depended	on	local	clients	has	fluctuated	over	the	course	of	the	War	on	Terror.	As
the	US	has	withdrawn	its	combat	troops	from	Iraq—leaving	behind	private	military	contractors,	special	operations
forces,	and	training	and	advisory	personnel—its	military	doctrine	has	also	concurrently	shifted	to	emphasize
“indirect”	counterinsurgencies.	Where	the	first	version	of	the	US	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual	provided	the
guidelines	for	US	troops	pacifying	intransigent	populations,	the	updated	2014	version	(whose	name	has	changed	to
Insurgencies	and	Countering	Insurgencies)	now	emphasizes	“indirect”	work	from	the	outset,	and	any	US	military
operation	is	seen	as	occurring	entirely	within	the	context	of	a	“host	nation.” 	Certainly,	the	activities	of	drones
and	special	operations	forces	similarly	require	the	acquiescence	of	host	nations	and	the	cooperation	of	their	proxy
forces	in	provision	of	intelligence,	targeting	data,	and	necessary	diplomatic,	political,	and	legal	cover.	The	use	of
proxies	reinforces	the	creation	of	interstitial	spaces	in	which	“extraterritoriality,	legal	and	procedural	ambiguity,”
and	a	calibrated	visibility/invisibility	create	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	rule	from	a	distance,	freed	from	demands
for	accountability	or	transparency.
Conclusions
An	attempt	to	cloak	the	calibrated	use	of	force	within	a	discourse	either	of	humanitarian	rescue,	or	of	scientifically
precise	wielding	of	violence	has	been	the	distinguishing	feature	of	counterinsurgency	and	counterterrorism
warfighting	by	the	US	in	the	long	twentieth	century,	but	especially	in	the	War	on	Terror.	The	convergence	of
neoliberal	managerial	innovations	and	military	doctrine	has	meant	the	emergence	of	a	series	of	modular
techniques	and	tools	that	can	be	deployed	in	a	range	of	combinations	across	different	contexts.	These	include
detention,	the	use	of	robotic	wars,	mass	surveillance,	and	the	employment	of	private	military	firms.
What	characterizes	the	range	of	specific	tools	and	technologies	is	their	modularity,	which	lends	them	malleability
and	flexibility,	their	distribution	and	displacement	of	accountability	to	a	range	of	external	actors	(whether	private
firms	or	local	proxies),	and	their	careful	calibration	of	visibility	and	invisibility.	Through	these	mechanisms,	warfare
can	be	waged	cloaked	in	a	discourse	of	legality,	humanitarianism,	and	right,	while	transparency	and	accountability
are	kept	to	a	minimum.
Perhaps	most	significantly,	what	counterterrorism	and	counterinsurgency	warfare	do	is	to	provide	technical
solutions	to	what	are	ultimately	political	problems.	By	always	perfecting	short-term	responses	to	fundamental
questions	of	global	inequality	in	power	and	resources,	these	forms	of	warfare	make	acceptable	the	use	of	violent
intervention	in	addressing	political	contestation	and	revolt,	conflicts	and	insurgencies.	But	these	technical	solutions
also	have	another	effect.	In	the	new	colonial	context,	they	make	governance	the	work	of	militaries.	Conquered	or
subjugated	populations	are	transformed	into	adversaries	who	are	kept	in	good	order	through	the	application	of
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ever-increasingly	refined	lethal	methods	of	control.
Bibliography
Amoore,	Louise	(2006).	“Biometric	Borders:	Governing	Mobilities	in	the	War	on	Terror,”	Political	Geography	25:
336–351.
Amoore,	Louise	(2013).	The	Politics	of	Possibility:	Risk	and	Security	beyond	Probability	(Durham:	Duke	University
Press).
Anghie,	Antony	(2005).	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge
University	Press).
Azarva,	Jeffrey	(2009).	“Is	U.S.	Detention	Policy	in	Iraq	Working?,”	in	Middle	East	Quarterly	(Winter):	5–14.
Becker,	Jo	and	Scott	Shane	(2012).	“Secret	‘Kill	List’	Proves	a	Test	of	Obama’s	Principles	and	Will,”	New	York
Times,	May	29	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html
Begg,	Moazzam	with	Victoria	Brittain	(2006).	Enemy	Combatant:	The	Terrifying	True	Story	of	a	Briton	in
Guantánamo	(London:	Pocket	Books).
Belcher,	Oliver	(2013).	The	Afterlives	of	Counterinsurgency:	Postcolonialism,	Military	Social	Science,	and
Afghanistan	2006–2012	(Vancouver:	University	of	British	Columbia	doctoral	dissertation).
Bernard,	Cheryl	et	al.	(2008).	Women	and	Nation-Building	(Santa	Monica,	CA:	RAND	Corp.).
Brennan,	John	(2012).	“The	Ethics	and	Efficacy	of	the	President’s	Counterterrorism	Strategy”	(Washington	DC:
Woodrow	Wilson	International	Center	for	Scholars)	http://www.lawfareblog.com/text-john-brennans-
speech-drone-strikes-today-wilson-center
Blum,	Gabriella	(2012).	“Invisible	Threats”	(Stanford,	CA:	Hoover	Institution)
http://www.hoover.org/research/emerging-threats-invisible-threats
Broadwell,	Paula	with	Vernon	Loeb	(2012).	All	In:	The	Education	of	General	David	Petraeus	(New	York:	Penguin).
Brooks,	Mason	and	Drew	Miller	(2009).	“Inside	the	Detention	Camps:	A	New	Campaign	in	Iraq,”	in	Joint	Forces
Quarterly	52:	129–133.
Chatterjee,	Pratap	(2004).	Iraq	Inc.:	A	Profitable	Occupation	(New	York:	Seven	Stories	Press).
Crumpton,	Henry	A.	(2012).	The	Art	of	Intelligence:	Lessons	from	a	Life	in	the	C.I.A.’s	Clandestine	Service	(New
York:	Penguin).
Dadkhah,	Lara	(2008).	“Close	Air	Support	and	Civilian	Casualties	in	Afghanistan,”	Small	Wars	Journal,	December
30	http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/close-air-support-and-civilian-casualties-in-afghanistan
Dana	Priest	and	William	Arkin	(2011).	Top	Secret	America:	The	Rise	of	the	New	American	Security	State	(New
York:	Little	Brown	and	Co.).
Davis,	Rochelle	(2010).	“Culture	as	a	Weapon	System,”	in	Middle	East	Report	255.
Department	of	Defense	(2007).	“The	Role	of	Biometrics	in	the	Counterinsurgency.	Department	of	Defense	Bloggers
Roundtable	with	Lieutenant	Colonel	John	W.	Velliquette	Jr.,	USA,	Iraqi	Biometrics	Manager,	Coalition	Police
Assistance	Training	Team	Mission,	Via	Teleconference	from	Iraq,”	August	15
http://www.defense.gov/home/blog/docs/20070815BloggersRoundtable%20wLTC%20Velliquette_transcript.pdf
Department	of	Defense	(2012).	“Sustaining	U.S.	Global	Leadership:	Priorities	for	21st	Century	Defense”
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 10 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
Elkins,	Caroline	(2005).	Britain’s	Gulag:	The	Brutal	End	of	Empire	in	Kenya	(London:	Pimlico).
Fanon,	Frantz	(1963).	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth,	Constance	Farrington	(trans.)	(New	York:	Grove	Press).
Fay,	MG	George	R.	(2004).	“AR	15–6	Investigation	of	the	Abu	Ghraib	Detention	Facility	and	205th	Military
Intelligence	Brigade”	(Washington,	DC)	http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf
Feichtinger,	Moritz	and	Stephan	Malinowski	(2012).	“Transformative	Invasions:	Western	Post-9/11
Counterinsurgency	and	the	Lessons	of	Colonialism,”	Chase	Richards	(trans.).	Humanity	3,1:	35–63.
Fifield,	Anna	(2013).	“Contractors	reap	$138B	from	Iraq	war,”	CNN,	March	19
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/19/business/iraq-war-contractors/
Foucault,	Michel	(2003).	Society	Must	Be	Defended:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France	1975–1976.	Mauro	Bertani
et	al.	(eds),	David	Macey	(trans.)	(New	York:	Picador).
Foucault,	Michel	(2000).	Power.	Essential	Works	of	Michel	Foucault	1954–1984.	James	D.	Faubion	(ed.)	(New	York:
New	Press).
Gates,	Robert	(2014).	Duty:	Memoirs	of	a	Secretary	at	War	(New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf).
Gavriel,	Alexei	(2014).	“Incorporating	Cultural	Intelligence	into	Joint	Intelligence:	Cultural	Intelligence	and
Ethnographic	Intelligence,”	in	Johnson	and	Zellen	(eds).	Culture,	Conflict,	and	Counterinsurgency	(Stanford:
Stanford	University	Press):	19–45.
Gill,	Lesley	(2004).	The	School	of	the	Americas:	Military	Training	and	Political	Violence	in	the	Americas	(Durham:
Duke	University	Press).
Gorka,	Sebastian	and	David	Kilcullen	(2011).	“An	Actor-Centric	Theory	of	War:	Understanding	the	Difference
between	COIN	and	Counterinsurgency,”	in	Joint	Forces	Quarterly	60:	14–18.
Gottman,	Jean	(1943).	“Bugeaud,	Galliéni,	Lyautey:	the	Development	of	French	Colonial	Warfare”	in	Earle	(ed.).
Makers	of	Modern	Strategy:	Military	Thought	from	Machiavelli	to	Hitler	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press):
234–259.
Graham,	Stephen	(2009).	“Cities	as	Battlespace:	The	New	Military	Urbanism,”	City	13,4:	383–402.
Greenwald,	Glenn	(2014).	No	Place	to	Hide:	Edward	Snowden,	the	NSA	and	the	Surveillance	State	(New	York:
Metropolitan	Books).
Gregory,	Derek	(2004).	The	Colonial	Present:	Afghanistan,	Palestine,	Iraq	(Oxford:	Wiley-Blackwell).
Gregory,	Derek	(2006).	“The	Death	of	the	Civilian?,”	Environment	and	Planning	D	24:	633–638.
Hafetz,	Jonathan	(2011).	Habeas	Corpus	after	9/11:	Confronting	America’s	New	Global	Detention	System	(New
York:	New	York	University	Press).
Hajjar,	Lisa	(2003).	“From	Nuremberg	to	Guantánamo:	International	Law	and	American	Power	Politics,”	in	Middle
East	Report	229:	8–15.
Hajjar,	Lisa	(2005).	Courting	Conflict:	The	Israeli	Military	Court	System	in	the	West	Bank	and	Gaza	(Berkeley:
University	of	California	Press).
Hastings,	Michael	(2012).	The	Operators:	The	Wold	and	Terrifying	Inside	Story	of	America’s	War	in	Afghanistan
(London:	Phoenix).
Heggoy,	Alf	Andrew	(1972).	Insurgency	and	Counterinsurgency	in	Algeria	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press).
Hersh,	Seymour	(2004).	Chain	of	Command:	The	Road	from	9/11	to	Abu	Ghraib	(New	York:	HarperCollins).
Horesh,	Roxanne	(2010).	“To	Die	or	Conquer	the	Hill:	Sites	of	Resistance	for	Jewish	Detainees	in	British	Mandate
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 11 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
Prisons	in	East	Africa,	1944–1948”	(Oxford:	unpublished	MPhil	thesis).
Johnson,	Thomas	H.	and	Barry	Scott	Zellen	(eds)	(2014).	Culture,	Conflict,	and	Counterinsurgency	(Stanford:
Stanford	University	Press).
Jones,	Christopher	(1997).	“Unmanned	Aerial	Vehicles	(UAVs):	An	Assessment	of	Historical	Operations	and	Future
Possibilities,”	A	Research	Paper	Presented	To	The	Research	Department	Air	Command	and	Staff	College
http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/97-0230D.pdf
Kaplan,	Fred	(2013).	The	Insurgents:	David	Petraeus	and	the	Plot	to	Change	the	American	Way	of	War	(New	York:
Simon	and	Schuster).
Kaplan,	Robert	D.	(2005).	Imperial	Grunts:	On	the	Ground	with	the	American	Military,	from	Mongolia	to	the
Philippines	to	Iraq	and	Beyond	(New	York:	Vintage).
Kelly,	George	Armstrong	(1965).	Lost	Soldiers:	The	French	Army	and	Empire	in	Crisis	1947–1962	(Cambridge,
Mass:	MIT	Press).
Kelly,	Tobias	(2006).	Law,	Violence	and	Sovereignty	among	West	Bank	Palestinians	(Cambridge:	Cambridge
University	Press).
Khalili,	Laleh	(2010a).	“Tangled	Webs	of	Coercion:	Parastatal	Production	of	Violence	in	Abu	Ghraib,”	in	Khalili	and
Schwedler	(eds).	Policing	and	Prisons	in	the	Middle	East:	Formations	of	Coercion	(London:	Hurst).
Khalili,	Laleh	(2010b).	“The	New	(and	Old)	Classics	of	Counterinsurgency,”	in	Middle	East	Report	255:	14–23.
Khalili,	Laleh	(2011a).	“Gendered	Practices	of	Counterinsurgency,”	in	Review	of	International	Studies	37,4:	1471–
1491.
Khalili,	Laleh	(2011b).	“The	Location	of	Palestine	in	Global	Counterinsurgencies,”	in	International	Journal	of	Middle
East	Studies	42,3:	413–433.
Khalili,	Laleh	(2012a).	“COIN	vs.	CT,”	in	Middle	East	Report	Blog,	January	9	http://www.merip.org/coin-vs-ct
Khalili,	Laleh	(2012b).	“Fighting	Over	Drones,”	in	Middle	East	Report	264:	18–22.
Khalili,	Laleh	(2013a).	“The	tip	of	the	spear:	US	Special	Operations	Forces,”	in	Al	Jazeera,	March	29
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/201332811912362162.html
Khalili,	Laleh	(2013b).	Time	in	the	Shadows:	Confinement	in	Counterinsurgencies	(Stanford:	Stanford	University
Press).
Khalili,	Laleh	(2014a).	“Scholar,	Pope,	Soldier,	Spy,”	Humanity	5,3.
Khalili,	Laleh	(2014b).	“The	Uses	of	Happiness	in	Counterinsurgencies,”	in	Social	Text	118:	23–43.
Khalili,	Laleh	(forthcoming).	“The	Utility	of	Proxy	Detention	in	Counterinsurgencies,”	in	Bachmann,	Bell,	Holmqvist
(eds).	The	New	Interventionism:	Assemblages	of	War:	Police	(London:	Routledge).
Kilcullen,	David	(2006).	“Counterinsurgency	Redux,”	in	Survival	48,4:	111–130.
Kilcullen,	David	(2006).	“Twenty-Eight	Articles:	Fundamentals	of	Company-Level	Counterinsurgency,”	in	Military
Review,	May–June	2006:	103–108.
Kilcullen,	David	(2008).	“Road-Building	in	Afghanistan,”	Small	Wars	Journal,	April	24
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/political-maneuver-in-counterinsurgency
Kilcullen,	David	(2009a).	Accidental	Guerrilla:	Fighting	Small	Wars	in	the	Midst	of	a	Big	One	(London:	Hurst	&
Co.).
Kilcullen,	David	(2009b).	“Measuring	Progress	in	Afghanistan,”	http://blog.oup.com/2010/06/afghanistan/
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 12 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
Kilcullen,	David	(2010).	Counterinsurgency	(London:	Hurst	&	Co.).
Kilcullen,	David	(2013).	Out	of	the	Mountains:	The	Coming	Age	of	the	Urban	Guerrilla	(London:	Hurst	&	Co.).
Kinsey,	Christopher	(2009).	Private	Contractors	and	the	Reconstruction	of	Iraq:	Transforming	Military	Logistics
(London:	Routledge).
Koh,	Harold	Hongju	(2010).	“The	Obama	Administration	and	International	Law,”
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm
Lambeth,	Benjamin	S.	(2005).	Air	Power	Against	Terror:	America’s	Conduct	of	Operation	Enduring	Freedom	(Santa
Monica,	CA:	RAND	Corp.).
Li,	Darryl	(forthcoming).	“Offshoring	the	Army:	Migrant	Workers	and	the	U.S.	Military,”	in	UCLA	Law	Review	62.
Lipman,	Jana	K.	(2009).	Guantánamo:	A	Working	Class	History	between	Empire	and	Revolution	(Berkeley:
University	of	California	Press).
Lutz,	Catherine	(ed.)	(2009).	The	Bases	of	Empire:	The	Global	Struggle	against	U.S.	Military	Posts	(New	York:	New
York	University	Press).
Lujan,	Fernando	(2013).	“Light	Footprints:	The	Future	of	American	Military	Intervention,”	(Washington	DC:	Center
for	a	New	American	Security)	http://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/light-footprints-the-future-of-
american-military-intervention
Mazetti,	Mark	(2013).	The	Way	of	the	Knife:	The	C.I.A.,	A	Secret	Army,	and	a	War	at	the	Ends	of	the	Earth	(New
York:	Penguin).
McChrystal,	General	Stanley	(2013).	My	Share	of	the	Task	(New	York:	Penguin).
McFate,	Montgomery	(2005).	“The	Military	Utility	of	Understanding	Adversary	Culture,”	Joint	Forces	Quarterly	38:
42–48.
McFate,	Montgomery,	Britt	Damon,	and	Robert	Holliday	(2012).	“What	Do	Commanders	Really	Want	to	Know?	U.S.
Army	Human	Terrain	System	Lessons	Learned	from	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,”	in	Laurence	and	Matthews	(eds).	The
Oxford	Handbook	of	Military	Psychology	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press):	92–113.
McKelvey,	Tara	(2007).	Monstering:	Inside	America’s	Policy	of	Secret	Interrogations	and	Torture	in	the	Terror
War	(New	York:	Carroll	and	Graf	Publishers).
Mégret,	Frédéric	(2006).	“From	‘Savages’	to	‘Unlawful	Combatants’:	A	Postcolonial	Look	at	International
Humanitarian	Law’s	‘Other,’”	in	Orford	(ed.).	International	Law	and	Its	Others	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University
Press):	265–317.
Milne,	David	(2008).	America’s	Rasputin:	Walt	Rostow	and	the	Vietnam	War	(New	York:	Hill	and	Wang).
Nagl,	John	A.	(2005).	Learning	to	Eat	Soup	with	a	Knife:	Counterinsurgency	Lessons	from	Malaya	and	Vietnam
(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press).
Nagl,	John	(2010).	“Local	Security	Forces,”	in	Rid	and	Kearney	(eds).	Understanding	Counterinsurgency:	Doctrine,
Operations	and	Challenges	(London:	Routledge):	160–170.
Petraeus,	David	(2006).	“Learning	Counterinsurgency:	Observations	from	Soldiering	in	Iraq,”	Military	Review,
January–February:	2–12.
Porch,	Douglas	(2013).	Counterinsurgency	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press).
Price,	David	H.	(2011).	Weaponizing	Anthropology:	Social	Science	in	Service	of	the	Militarized	State	(Oakland,
CA:	AK	Press).
Rabinow,	Paul	(1989).	French	Modern:	Norms	and	Forms	of	the	Social	Environment	(Chicago:	University	of
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 13 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
Chicago	Press).
Ricks,	Thomas	E.	(2006).	Fiasco:	The	American	Military	Adventure	in	Iraq	(London:	Allen	Lane).
Ricks,	Thomas	E.	(2009).	The	Gamble:	General	Petraeus	and	the	Untold	Story	of	the	American	Surge	in	Iraq,
2006–2008	(London:	Allen	Lane).
Rid,	Thomas	and	Thomas	Kearney	(eds)	(2010).	Understanding	Counterinsurgency:	Doctrine,	Operations	and
Challenges	(London:	Routledge).
Scahill,	Jeremy	(2007).	Blackwater:	The	Rise	of	the	World’s	Most	Powerful	Mercenary	Army	(New	York:	Nation
Books).
Scahill,	Jeremy	(2013).	Dirty	Wars:	The	World	Is	a	Battlefield	(New	York:	Serpent’s	Tail).
Shachtman,	Noah	(2007).	“How	Technology	Almost	Lost	the	War:	In	Iraq,	the	Critical	Networks	Are	Social—Not
Electronic,”	Wired.com,	November	27	http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-
12/ff_futurewar
Shahrani,	Nazif	M.	(2002).	“War,	Factionalism,	and	the	State	in	Afghanistan,”	American	Anthropologist	104,3:	715–
722.
Shaw,	Martin	(2005).	The	New	Western	Way	of	War:	Risk-Transfer	War	and	its	Crisis	in	Iraq	(Oxford:	Polity).
Short,	Anthony	(1975).	The	Communist	Insurrection	in	Malaya	(London:	Frederick	Muller	Ltd.).
Sifton,	John	(2012).	“A	Brief	History	of	Drones,”	Nation,	February	27
http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones
Silverstein,	Ken	(2000).	Private	Warriors	(New	York:	Verso).
Singer,	Peter	W.	(2003).	Corporate	Warriors:	The	Rise	of	the	Privatized	Military	Industry	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell
University	Press).
Singer,	Peter	W.	(2004).	“War,	Profits,	and	the	Vacuum	of	Law:	Privatized	Military	Firms	and	International	Law,”	in
Columbia	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	42,2:	521–549.
Singer,	Peter	W.	(2007).	“Can’t	Win	with	‘Em,	Can’t	Go	to	War	without	‘Em:	Private	Military	Contractors	and
Counterinsurgency,”	Brookings	Policy	Paper	No.	4.
Stillman,	Sarah	(2011).	“The	Invisible	Army:	For	foreign	workers	on	U.S.	bases	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	war	can	be
hell,”	New	Yorker,	June	6,	2011.
Tawil-Suri,	Helga	(2010).	“Orange,	Green,	and	Blue:	Palestinian	ID	Cards	as	Media	and	Material	Artifacts,”	in	Lyon,
Zureik,	and	Abu-Laban	(eds).	Surveillance	and	State	of	Exception:	The	Case	of	Israel/Palestine	(New	York:
Routledge):	219–238.
Therborn,	Göran	(2009).	“NATO’s	Demographer,”	New	Left	Review	56:	136–144.
Thompson,	Robert	(1968).	“Squaring	the	Error,”	in	Foreign	Affairs	46,3:	442–453.
United	States	Army	and	Marine	Corps	(2007).	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual:	US	Army	Field	Manual	No.	3–24;
Marine	Corps	Warfighting	Publication	No.	3–33.5	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press).
United	States	Army	and	Marine	Corps	(2014).	Insurgencies	and	Countering	Insurgencies:	US	Army	Field	Manual
No.	3–24;	Marine	Corps	Warfighting	Publication	No.	3–33.5,	C1.	(Washington	DC:	United	States	Army)
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html
Valentine,	Douglas	(1990).	The	Phoenix	Program	(New	York:	William	Morrow	&	Co.).
Verkuil,	Paul	R.	(2007).	Outsourcing	Sovereignty:	Why	Privatization	of	Government	Functions	Threatens
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 14 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
Democracy	and	What	We	Can	Do	About	It	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press).
Vine,	David	(2011).	Island	of	Shame:	The	Secret	History	of	the	U.S.	Military	Base	on	Diego	Garcia	(Princeton:
Princeton	University	Press).
Weizman,	Eyal	(2007).	Hollow	Land:	Israel’s	Architecture	of	Occupation	(London:	Verso).
Woodward,	Bob	(2002).	Bush	at	War	(New	York:	Pocket	Books).
Woodward,	Bob	(2004).	Plan	of	Attack	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster).
Woodward,	Bob	(2010).	Obama’s	Wars	(New	York:	Simon	&	Schuster).
Notes:
( )	I	use	the	terminology	(counterinsurgency,	counterterrorism,	and	War	on	Terror)	that	have	become	predominant
in	the	military	discourse.	Although	I	do	recognize	that	all	these	terms	are	laden	with	the	politics	out	of	which	they
have	emerged,	I	nevertheless	use	them	here	in	order	to	subject	them	to	critical	analysis.	On	Rostow,	see	Milne
(2008).
( )	Gregory	(2004);	Feichtinger	and	Malinowski	(2012);	Khalili	(2013b).
( )	Gorka	and	Kilcullen	(2011).
( )	Kilcullen	(2006;	2009a,	2009b;	2010);	Nagl	(2005);	Porch	(2013);	US	Army	and	Marine	Corps	(2007;	2014).
( )	Khalili	(2013b).	The	counterinsurgents	themselves	use	the	terminology	“population-centric”	vs	“enemy-centric”
counterinsurgency	to	distinguish	between	wars	that	incorporate	the	use	of	humanitarian	and	developmental
practice	and	discourse	as	opposed	to	asymmetric	warfare	that	has	no	compunctions	about	using	violence	and
terror	without	dressing	it	in	the	language	of	civilization	or	progress.
( )	Gregory	(2006);	Khalili	(2013b:	206–210).
( )	Woodward	(2002).
( )	Crumpton	(2012).
( )	Dadkhah	(2008);	Lambeth	(2005).
( )	Shahrani	(2002).
( )	ISAF	and	Operation	Enduring	Freedom	were	integrated	from	2008/2009	onwards.
( )	Woodward	(2004);	Ricks	(2006).
( )	McChrystal	(2013);	Scahill	(2013);	McKelvey	(2007).
( )	Hersh	(2004);	Fay	(2004);	McKelvey	(2007).
( )	US	Army	and	Marine	Corps	(2007);	Kilcullen	(2009a;	2010).
( )	Ricks	(2009);	Broadwell	and	Loeb	(2012).
( )	Kilcullen	(2008).
( )	Khalili	(2013b).
( )	Nagl	(2010);	Petraeus	(2006).
( )	Woodward	(2010);	Gates	(2014).
( )	Khalili	(2012a);	Mazetti	(2013).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 15 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
( )	Department	of	Defense	(2012).
( )	Foucault	(2003:	241);	Foucault	(2000:	416).
( )	Khalili	(2012a;	2014a).
( )	Khalili	(2011a;	2014b);	Weizman	(2007).
( )	Anghie	(2005);	Hajjar	(2003;	2005);	Mégret	(2006).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	65–100);	Begg	and	Brittain	(2006).
( )	For	example,	health	clinics	can	be	used	as	a	site	of	intelligence-gathering	(as	they	were	in	Afghanistan;
Barnard	et	al.	(2008)),	roads	can	be	used	for	the	movement	of	materiel;	and	markets	are	excellent	spaces	for
measuring	the	success	of	counterinsurgency	efforts	(Kilcullen	(2008);	Khalili	(2014b)).
( )	Rabinow	(1989:	150);	Gottman	(1943).
( )	Therborn	(2009);	Khalili	(2013b).
( )	Johnson	and	Zellen	(2014);	Davis	(2010);	McFate	(2005);	McFate	et	al.	(2012).
( )	Gavriel	(2014).
( )	Khalili	(2013a;	2014a).
( )	Lujan	(2013);	Mazetti	(2013);	Scahill	(2013).
( )	Khalili	(2013b).
( )	Elkins	(2005);	Kelly	(1965:	189–190);	Heggoy	(1972:	182);	Short	(1975).
( )	Valentine	(1990).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	141–142).
( )	Brooks	and	Miller,	(2009:	130–131).
( )	Azarva	(2009).
( )	Khalili	(2011b;	2013b).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	193–196).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	172–212).
( )	Hafetz	(2011).
( )	For	exceptions	see	Horesh	(2010),	Khalili	(2013b:	65–100).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	101–138);	also	see	The	Rendition	Project	at	http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/.
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	105–115).
( )	Jones	(1997).
( )	Sifton	(2012).
( )	See	the	data	available	at	the	Bureau	of	Investigative	Journalism,
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/.
( )	Brennan	(2012);	Koh	(2010).
( )	Blum	(2012:	11).
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 16 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
( )	Shaw	(2005).
( )	Khalili	(2012b).
( )	Becker	and	Shane	(2012).
( )	Fifield	(2013).
( )	Li	(Forthcoming),	Lipman	(2009);	Stillman	(2011).
( )	Silverstein	(2000);	Scahill	(2007);	Chatterjee	(2004);	Singer	(2003;	2004;	2007).
( )	Fay	(2004);	Kinsey	(2009:	12).
( )	Priest	and	Arkin	(2011).
( )	Khalili	(2011b:	421).	Also	see	Tawil-Suri	(2010).
( )	Amoore	(2006);	Department	of	Defense	(2007);	Graham	(2009).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	200).
( )	Shachtman	(2007).
( )	Amoore	(2013).
( )	Belcher	(2013:	165–194);	Greenwald	(2014).
( )	On	the	work	of	Caerus,	see	Kilcullen	(2013).
( )	Kaplan	(2005:	48).
( )	Petraeus	(2006:	3).
( )	Gill	(2004);	Khalili	(forthcoming).
( )	Lutz	(2009);	Vine	(2011).
( )	Fanon	(1963:	148–205).
( )	Khalili	(2013b:	246–248;	forthcoming).
( )	US	Army	and	Marine	Corps	(2014).
( )	Khalili	(2010a:	78);	also	Khalili	(forthcoming).
Laleh	Khalili
School	of	Oriental	and	African	Studies,	University	of	London
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Neoliberal Age
Page 17 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 September 2015
